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Boudreaux v. Cummings: Time to Interrupt an
Erroneous Approach to Acquisitive Prescription
INTRODUCTION
In rural Vermilion Parish, the seasonal fall sight is the hustle of harvest
time. After months of planting crops and watching them grow, Farmer
Boudreaux was ready to reap the fruits of his labor. As he had done for the
past 50 years, Boudreaux had his plans down to a methodical science. His
combines and tractors would enter his right-of-way, travel through his
neighbor’s land, and arrive at his fields. When harvest day arrived, much
to Boudreaux’s surprise, the gate to the right-of-way had been chained and
locked shut.1 After using the right-of-way continuously for so long,
Boudreaux always believed that he had a legal right of use. However, four
Louisiana Supreme Court justices disagreed and denied any kind of legal
access, despite Boudreaux’s long use and adamant belief of his right of
use.
Keeping with civilian tradition, the Louisiana Civil Code, which
governs property disputes like Boudreaux faced, frames legal principles in
general terms,2 and problems often arise in new areas of the law in which
the Civil Code provides little or no guidance. In the 1977 revision of the
Civil Code, acquisitive prescription, known in the common law as
“adverse possession,”3 applied for the first time to apparent, discontinuous
servitudes—a legal right to, among other things, use a portion of land
belonging to another.4 This legal right is the right that Boudreaux believed
he held.5 The Civil Code provides little guidance for this sweeping change
Copyright 2017, by CODY J. MILLER.
1. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 560–61 (La. 2015) (describing
the facts of the case similar to this opening paragraph).
2. Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of Precedent: A
Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common Law Nation,
65 LA. L. REV. 775, 793 (2005).
3. N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 LA. L.
REV. 1265, 1280 (1994) (“Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring
ownership by possession for a period of time. Similar to acquiring title through
adverse possession under the statute of limitations.”).
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (2017).
5. The effect of the change in the law was not made retroactive, so time
could not begin accruing for acquisitive prescription of an apparent, discontinuous
predial servitude until the effective date of the change. Thus, if there is no good
faith or just title leading to abridged acquisitive prescription, the soonest someone
could claim ownership through acquisitive prescription would have been 30 years
from the 1977 revision. LA. CIV. CODE art. 740 cmt. a.
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and left a legal quandary lying dormant for over 30 years.6 Boudreaux v.
Cummings led the Louisiana Supreme Court to confront the issue of
acquisitive prescription of a predial servitude,7 but the Court failed to
apply proper civilian analyses and continued to leave the state of the law
unclear.
Acquisitive prescription, or the ability to acquire a real right over a
specified period of time,8 should have allowed Boudreaux to acquire a
predial servitude of legal use over a portion of his neighbor’s land.9 A
divided Supreme Court held, however, that Boudreaux did not acquire a
predial servitude because “acts of simple tolerance” by his neighbors
represented tacit permission.10 As the Court provided no clear explanation
of those acts, its incomplete analyses resulted in two problems. First, the
Court’s plurality and concurring justices ignored the plain language of the
Civil Code articles establishing burden-shifting presumptions in favor of
possessors, altering a previously settled area of the law.11 Second, and
more importantly, the Court unnecessarily confused the issue of
acquisitive prescription of predial servitudes through an improper civilian
approach. By failing to define terms and engage in a complete analysis,
the justices only recited the relevant Code articles while misapplying
civilian methodology.
Part I of this Comment provides background information on the
fundamentals of proper civilian interpretation of the Civil Code, which
contains the law on predial servitudes, acquisitive prescription, and
possession. Putting these foundational principles into the context of a
specific property law conflict, Part II explains the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s decision in Boudreaux v. Cummings, revealing the problems that
arise from the Court’s failure to distinguish between a servitude and the
underlying land. Part III explores how the Court’s application of civilian
methods were incomplete. Part IV presents both a retrospective solution
and a prospective one for future cases despite the improper civilian
approach used in Boudreaux. It advocates for Louisiana courts to return to
their civilian roots and approach confusing legal issues with the clarity and
categorization of civilian deductive reasoning.

6. A. N. Yiannopoulos, Possession, 51 LA. L. REV. 523, 527 (1991) [hereinafter
Possession].
7. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 561 (La. 2015).
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3446.
9. Id. art. 646 (defining a predial servitude); id. art. 705 (defining a servitude
of passage).
10. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562–64.
11. Id. at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
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I. BACKGROUND: THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND, THIS LAND IS MY LAND?
Unlike the 49 common law states, the sources of law in a civilian
jurisdiction like Louisiana12 are legislation and custom.13 Property law is
specifically within the private law domain of the Louisiana Civil Code,
which governs things and their ownership.14 Although Louisiana law
admittedly has a distinct common law influence, substantive private law,
including predial servitudes, acquisitive prescription, and possession, is
still firmly within the ambit of the civil law.15
Any well-reasoned analysis must begin with a strong foundation.
Louisiana judges readily have this foundation, the Civil Code, at their
disposal, “provid[ing] a solid base from which courts work to decide
cases.”16 Presenting many property issues and arguments of ownership
originating deep within the framework of the Civil Code, Boudreaux is the
perfect case to demonstrate the importance of beginning any civilian
analysis with the heart of the civil law—the Code.
A. Servitudes at Your Service
As the primary source of legislation, the Civil Code is the starting point
for any examination of predial servitudes,17 acquisitive prescription,18 and
possession. The Code provides that a predial servitude is “a charge on a
servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate,” with the two estates
12. Christopher Osakwe, Louisiana Legal System: A Confluence of Two
Legal Traditions, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 29, 30 (1986).
13. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1; id. art. 2 (“Legislation is a solemn expression of
legislative will.”); id. art. 3 (“Custom results from practice repeated for a long
time and generally accepted as having acquired the force of law.”). The two
sources of law in common law jurisdictions tend to be statutory law and case law
developed by precedent. See Giacomo A.M. Ponzetto & Patricio A. Fernandez,
Case Law versus Statute Law: An Evolutionary Comparison, 37 J. LEGAL STUD.
379, 411 (2008).
14. Algero, supra note 2, at 793.
15. Jean Louis Bergel, Principal Features and Methods of Codification, 48
LA. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (1988) (“The modern Louisiana legal system is
fundamentally a derivative common law system, albeit with a civil law thicket.”).
16. Algero, supra note 2, at 778.
17. Kinsella, supra note 3, at 1291 (“A predial servitude is a charge on a
servient estate for the benefit of a dominant estate. Similar to an appurtenant
easement.”).
18. Id. at 1280 (“Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership
by possession for a period of time. Similar to acquiring title through adverse
possession under the statute of limitations.”).
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having different owners.19 For designation and categorization purposes, a
predial servitude is an incorporeal immovable,20 which grants a distinct
right that the dominant estate owner is entitled to exercise.21 There are
many different types of predial servitudes that estate owners may establish,
but the most relevant in light of Boudreaux is a servitude of passage,
explicitly recognized by the Civil Code as “the right for the benefit of the
dominant estate whereby persons, animals, utilities, or vehicles are
permitted to pass through the servient estate.”22
A predial servitude may be established in one of three ways: juridical
act, prescription, or destination.23 The acquisition of a servitude by
prescription, however, only applies to apparent servitudes.24 Apparent
servitudes, as contrasted from nonapparent servitudes, include those
perceived “by exterior signs, works, or constructions; such as a
roadway.”25 The 1977 revision of the articles on acquisitive prescription
distinctly changed the law by applying prescription to apparent servitudes
broadly, in contrast with only continuous apparent servitudes.26 After the
revision, prescription now specifically applies to “rights of passage on
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (2017). The “dominant estate” is the one that
receives the benefit of the servitude. Id. art. 647. The “servient estate” is the one
that owes the duty of the servitude to the dominant estate. Id. art. 651. In this
context, an “estate” means “a distinct corporeal immovable” that can be tracts of
land, buildings, timber estates, or individual apartments. Id. art. 646 cmt. b.
20. Id. art. 649. An “incorporeal” is something that “ha[s] no body, but [is]
comprehended by the understanding.” Id. art. 461. “Immovables” are things like
tracts of land and their component parts, buildings and their component parts, and
standing timber. Id. art. 462–67. Thus, “incorporeal immovables” are “[r]ights
and actions that apply to immovable things.” Id. art. 470.
21. Id. art. 476 (providing that a predial servitude is a right in a thing).
22. Id. art. 705 (emphasis added to underscore that a predial servitude is a
“right”).
23. Id. art. 654 (stipulating that these three ways are specifically limited to
conventional and voluntary, rather than legal, servitudes). By “juridical act,” the
article refers to the “establishment of a predial servitude by title [as] an alienation
of a part of the property.” Id. art. 708. By “destination,” the article refers to the
creation of a servitude stemming from “a relationship established between two
estates owned by the same owner that would be a predial servitude if the estates
belonged to different owners,” and that relationship becomes an apparent
servitude as a default rule “[w]hen the two estates cease to belong to the same
owner.” Id. art. 741.
24. Id. art. 740 (omitting any reference to the ability to acquisitively prescribe
on a nonapparent servitude).
25. Id. art. 707.
26. Id. art. 740 cmt. a.
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land,”27 which was the issue in Boudreaux.28 Acquisitive prescription on
an apparent, but discontinuous, servitude consequently could not begin to
run until January 1, 1978,29 so any examination of the requisite elements
of possession to determine whether prescription has taken place must
begin with that date.
B. Possession: The Foundation of Prescription
The law of possession underlies the inquiry into whether a person like
Boudreaux acquired a real right through acquisitive prescription. The Civil
Code defines possession as “the detention or enjoyment of a corporeal thing,”
whether movable or immovable, that someone exercises or has someone else
exercise on his or her behalf.30 One element of the definition that
fundamentally contradicts the definition of a predial servitude is that
possession requires an underlying corporeal, or physical, thing.31 An
adjustment is necessary to fit this definition to an incorporeal—nonphysical—
thing such as a predial servitude.32
The Civil Code provides this adjustment by establishing an analogous
concept, “quasi-possession,” to apply to an incorporeal servitude: “The
exercise of a real right, such as a servitude, with the intent to have it as one’s
own is quasi-possession.”33 Notwithstanding the difference in terminology,
all of the other articles are to apply to quasi-possession by analogy.34
27. Christopher M. Hannan, Prescription Lenses: How Louisiana Courts
Should Apply the Revised Articles Governing Thirty-Year Acquisitive Prescription
of Apparent Servitudes, 53 LOY. L. REV. 937, 939–40 (2007).
28. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 560 (La. 2015).
29. Comment a states, “[A]pparent servitudes may be acquired by
prescription or by destination of the owner, even though they might be considered
discontinuous under the regime of the 1870 Code and thus insusceptible of such
modes of acquisition.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 740 cmt. a.
30. Id. art. 3421 (emphasis added).
31. JOHN RANDALL TRAHAN, LOUISIANA LAW OF PROPERTY: A PRÉCIS 175
(2012).
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 461 (“Corporeals are things that have a body, . . . and
can be felt or touched. Incorporeals are things that have no body, but are
comprehended by the understanding.”). This Code article explains the fundamental
difference between corporeal and incorporeal things. Because of the presupposition
that possession requires a corporeal thing, the fundamental difference between
corporeal and incorporeal things makes the conceptualization of possession itself
impossible. An adjustment to provide for an incorporeal thing is necessary.
TRAHAN, supra note 31, at 175–76.
33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421.
34. Id.
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Beyond this one distinction, however, the Civil Code is silent on how to
put the analogy into actual practice and does not offer any special rules
with which judges and practitioners should proceed.35 Using doctrine to
help expand the skeletal principles outlined by the Civil Code, the
Dictionary of the Civil Code defines quasi-possession as “that possession
. . . which leads to the acquisition of a real right other than ownership . . .
by performing, for a certain time, acts which are the same as those of the
exercise of the real right in question.”36 This definition draws out the
analogy by emphasizing how to apply the constitutive elements of
possession to quasi-possession.
For possession to be legally effective, it must include the two
component elements of animus, which is a state of mind, and corpus,
which is engaging in certain activity.37 The Civil Code defines corpus as
“the exercise of physical acts of use, detention, or enjoyment over a
thing.”38 With this emphasis on physical acts, the codal definition of
corpus needs an adjustment to be applicable to incorporeal things. Using
the method of analogy as directed by the Civil Code, corpus of an
incorporeal thing, such as a servitude, may instead be termed “quasicorpus” and would include “the exercise of acts of use or enjoyment of the
rights afforded by that servitude.”39 With this emphasis on using the real
right itself, as opposed to physical acts on the thing, the definition of quasicorpus retains the basic idea of use and enjoyment. By making a direct
connection to the right itself, the definition makes it easier to conceive of
an assertion of mental ownership over something that does not exist in
space.
Once a potential possessor establishes corpus, the Civil Code further
requires a necessary state of mind, or animus, for effective possession. For
animus to exist, “one must intend to possess as owner.”40 Although the
definition initially appears broad enough to apply to both corporeal and
incorporeal things, the article fails to clarify how one can “own” a predial
servitude, which itself is a right distinct from ownership.41 Adapting
animus to an incorporeal thing through quasi-animus, “one must intend to

35. Possession, supra note 6, at 527.
36. GÉRARD CORNU, DICTIONARY OF THE CIVIL CODE 467 (Alain Levasseur
& Marie-Eugénie Laporte-Lageais trans., 2014).
37. Possession, supra note 6, at 524–25.
38. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3425.
39. TRAHAN, supra note 31, at 176.
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3424. “[O]ne who takes corporeal possession of a
thing is presumed to have the intent to own it.” Id. art. 3424 cmt. b.
41. LA. CIV. CODE art. 476.
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have the right or rights afforded by that servitude as one’s own.”42 Because
the idea of a nonphysical thing is difficult to grasp, the emphasis of quasianimus involving the intention of holding the real right at issue helps to
clarify the concept. For both animus and quasi-animus, the Civil Code
provides a rebuttable presumption that a possessor has the requisite animus
as long as that person did not begin to possess for someone else.43 The
limitation on that presumption introduces precarious possession, which
occurs when a person begins possession of a thing with the permission of
the supposed owner.44
C. Like Oil and Water: Precarious Possession and Acquisitive
Prescription
To be effective, possession must include both of the requisite elements
of corpus and animus.45 If there is no animus, then the acts “take place
merely as acts of toleration.”46 The absence of animus or the admittance
of proof that possession began on someone else’s behalf implicates the
concept of precarious possession, which is insufficient for acquisitive
prescription.47 The Civil Code defines precarious possession as “[t]he
exercise of possession over a thing with the permission of or on behalf of
the owner or possessor.”48 The precarious possessor in turn suffers from a
legal presumption that he or she is presumed “to possess for another
although he may intend to possess for himself.”49 This presumption is an
important part of defeating acquisitive prescription and can be fatal to both
a supposed possessor and quasi-possessor.50

42. TRAHAN, supra note 31, at 176.
43. “One is presumed to intend to possess as owner unless he began to possess
in the name of and for another.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427. The presumption helps
ameliorate the problem that a person’s subjective state of mind may be difficult to
prove.
44. Id. arts. 3437–3440.
45. 1 MARCEL PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW 742 (La. State Law
Inst. trans., 2005).
46. Id.
47. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3437 (defining precarious possession), 3477 (explaining
precarious possessors cannot acquisitively prescribe on a thing).
48. Id. art. 3437.
49. Id. art. 3438.
50. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 562 (La. 2015) (explaining that
if Boudreaux suffered from the legal presumption, possessed precariously, and
had not followed the requisite steps to cure that precariousness, he could never
prescribe).
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The Civil Code is clear that precarious possession is incompatible with
the concept of acquisitive prescription, stating that “[a]cquisitive prescription
does not run in favor of a precarious possessor or his universal successor.”51
Assuming that there is true possession with both corpus and animus,
possessors may be able to use acquisitive prescription as “a mode of acquiring
ownership or other real rights by possession for a period of time.”52 There
are two types of acquisitive prescription for immovable things, abridged
and unabridged.53 For abridged acquisitive prescription, possessors and
quasi-possessors may acquire ownership or other real rights after a delay
of ten years.54 This abridged acquisitive prescription requires both good
faith and just title.55 For unabridged acquisitive prescription, possessors
and quasi-possessors may acquire ownership or other real rights after a
delay of 30 years with no requirement of good faith or just title.56
Assuming all requirements are met, a supposed possessor or quasipossessor may begin to make a case for acquisitive prescription.
D. Putting It All Together: Judges as Methodological Mixers
To make a determinative ruling on whether rights have been validly
acquired through acquisitive prescription, judges must utilize the various
interpretive tools and methodology provided in the civilian tradition. A
proper use of legal methodology is key for Louisiana judges to take the
basic general principles of the law and apply them to concrete situations.57
Although enacted law is always the starting point in civilian methodology,
there are a variety of secondary sources that can aid judges in interpretation.
These secondary sources include commentary, doctrine, and jurisprudence.58
Particularly in the area of property law, judges must use civilian methods of
interpretation as the private law contained in the Civil Code remains civilian
at its core.59 If the legislature has written the laws in a traditional civilian
style, the only proper way to interpret and apply them correctly is in a
similar fashion. Such faithfulness to the civilian tradition and an

51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3477.
52. Id. art. 3446.
53. See id. arts. 3473, 3486.
54. Id. art. 3473.
55. Id. art. 3475.
56. Id. art. 3486.
57. Algero, supra note 2, at 777.
58. Albert Tate, Jr., Civilian Methodology: Civilian Methodology in Louisiana,
44 TUL. L. REV. 673, 680 (1970).
59. Osakwe, supra note 12, at 38.
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acknowledgment of the importance of the Civil Code follow directly from
“the judge’s constitutional oath to support the law.”60
The first step in civilian methodology is consultation of the Civil Code
itself.61 Property law retains the civilian characteristics of generalized
wording that “provides a solid base from which courts work to decide
cases.”62 If ambiguities remain after legislative application and
interpretation, the next step is consultation of doctrine. Doctrine represents
an interpretation of the law itself and of its rationale, as opposed to the
common law consultation of case law, which emphasizes facts over law.63
Doctrine is a critical element of the civilian approach because of its ability
to comment on “the rules and the principles . . . of impure elements, and
thus provide both the practice and the courts with a guide for the
solution.”64 Louisiana judges confronting issues of substantive private law
have these interpretive tools at their ready disposal.
II. BOUDREAUX V. CUMMINGS: LEGAL BREAKTHROUGH
OR BREAKDOWN?
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s review of Boudreaux v. Cummings
could have been the perfect case for a proper application of the Civil Code
and the civilian methods of interpretation. Confronting an area of property
law within the Civil Code, the Court had the opportunity to use its civilian
tools to resolve whether an incorporeal predial servitude was created over
a corporeal piece of land.65 Armed with the Civil Code directive to
analogize the law of acquisitive prescription and possession to predial
servitudes, the justices confronted this novel issue in Boudreaux v.
Cummings.
A. Facts and Procedural History
In rural Vermilion Parish, two adjacent landowners, John Boudreaux
and Paul Cummings, were neighbors.66 A pathway over Cummings’s land

60. James L. Dennis, Interpretation and Application of the Civil Code and
the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 LA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1993).
61. Id. at 10.
62. Algero, supra note 2, at 778.
63. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law
(Codified and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 677, 701 (2000).
64. Id.
65. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 560 (La. 2015).
66. Id.
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connected Boudreaux’s land to one of the nearby public roads.67
Boudreaux claimed that he and his ancestors-in-title had used the path
since at least 1948 “to transport farm equipment, to get to and from town
for personal errands, and for convenient access to the adjacent road.”68
Although Cummings’s ancestors-in-title, the Weills, were aware of
Boudreaux’s use, they never prevented it.69 In fact, the testimony indicated
that both parties used the path and that Boudreaux and the Weills had
worked together in moving the path to a more convenient location in
1969.70 Boudreaux and others acting on his behalf made continuous use of
the path until Cummings locked the gate in 2012, preventing any use.71
Boudreaux subsequently brought suit, claiming the acquisition of a predial
servitude of passage.72
The trial court ruled in Boudreaux’s favor, claiming that he had
acquired a predial servitude of passage through acquisitive prescription of
30 years.73 The judge “found precarious possession was irrelevant to a
discussion of ownership of an incorporeal immovable, such as a predial
servitude.”74 The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
finding that “there was adequate evidence for the trial court to conclude
that Boudreaux was using the right of way on his own behalf, rather than
as a precarious possessor.”75 The dissenting judge, however, reasoned that
Boudreaux’s use was premised on permission from the Weills, meaning
prescription could not run in his favor as a precarious possessor.76 This
divergence at the appellate level foreshadowed the divide in opinions that
would occur at the Louisiana Supreme Court.77

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 562.
70. Id. at 560, 571.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 560.
74. Id. at 560–61.
75. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 138 So. 3d 797, 799 (La. Ct. App. 2014), rev’d,
167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015).
76. Id. at 801 (Amy, J., dissenting).
77. The resolution of Boudreaux by the Court resulted in a plurality opinion
authored by Justice Clark, a concurring opinion authored by Justice Weimer, a
dissenting opinion by Justice Knoll, and a dissenting opinion by Justice Crichton.
See generally Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559 (La. 2015).
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B. The Right-of-Way: A Not So Apparent Servitude
In Boudreaux, the Louisiana Supreme Court first addressed whether
Boudreaux had acquired a predial servitude of passage by acquisitive
prescription of 30 years.78 If Boudreaux did not begin his possession
adversely, then the next issue became whether he had given actual notice
to Cummings, or to Cummings’s ancestor-in-title, that he was beginning
to possess for himself.79
First, regarding acquisitive prescription, the Court concluded that
Boudreaux’s quasi-possession of the passageway was not adverse, so
acquisitive prescription could not begin to run in his favor as a precarious
quasi-possessor.80 Second, regarding the termination of precarious
possession, the Court concluded that Boudreaux did not give the requisite
actual notice to Cummings, or to the Weills, so he remained a precarious
possessor.81 In the end, “acquisitive prescription could not and did not run
in [Boudreaux’s] favor.”82
Citing primarily to A. N. Yiannopoulos’s Treatise on Predial
Servitudes, among other works, the plurality discussed how precarious
quasi-possession, in contrast to adverse quasi-possession, can occur even
with merely implied permission or with acts of “indulgence” or “good
neighborhood.”83 The Weills and Cummings, with a spirit of neighborliness,
had allowed Boudreaux to use the pathway uninterrupted, even if they never
gave actual, express permission. With this at least implied permission, the
Court held that Boudreaux could not benefit from the presumption that, as
quasi-possessor, he was quasi-possessing as owner.84 Instead, Boudreaux
suffered from the presumption that he began his quasi-possession
precariously. When precarious quasi-possessors other than co-owners wish
to terminate their precariousness, they must provide actual notice to the
person on whose behalf they are quasi-possessing, and Boudreaux offered
no evidence to show that he had provided such notice.85
78. Id. at 561.
79. Id. at 564. The Civil Code gives the only method in which a precarious
possessor may terminate his or her precariousness vis-à-vis someone other than a
co-owner: “[W]hen he gives actual notice of this intent to the person on whose
behalf he is possessing.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 3439 (2017).
80. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564 (explaining that Boudreaux lacked the
proper animus because his possession was with permission of the owner).
81. Id. at 564–65.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 563.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 562–64.
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Justice Weimer concurred in the holding of the plurality but provided
his own reasoning. He explained that, if implied permission can be derived
from acts of neighborliness, then a supposed quasi-possessor is presumed
to be engaging in precarious quasi-possession in such a situation, and the
quasi-possessor would have to rebut the presumption.86 In his opinion,
Justice Weimer explained that Cummings provided sufficient evidence to
support the presumption, including collaboration between the Weills and
Boudreaux in relocating the passageway and beneficial use by both
parties.87 The Weills allowed Boudreaux to use the passage “in the spirit
of being a good neighbor” and “for maintaining good relations.”88 Based
on these friendly, neighborly acts and what could at best be an equivocal
quasi-possession of the passageway, Justice Weimer reasoned that
Boudreaux remained a precarious quasi-possessor.89
C. An Analysis from Outside the Civil Code
With incomplete civilian methodology and confusing analyses, the
resulting opinions from Boudreaux cause more confusion than certainty in
the law. An analysis of the plurality and concurring opinions reveals two
principal problems. First, although unstated in their discussions, the
justices’ reasoning could result in possible changes in the legal
presumptions applied to acquisitive prescription. Second, and more
importantly, the justices conflate two distinct legal categories, collapsing
the incorporeal real servitude right and the underlying corporeal land into
one issue.
1. Legislating from the Bench
The analyses of both the plurality and the concurrence lead to undesirable
consequences that change, or at least confuse, the legal presumptions applied
to acquisitive prescription. Because the purported possessor is the only one
who knows his or her true state of mind, the proper animus of a possessor is
difficult to prove. Consequently, the Civil Code introduces presumptions to
aid in overcoming this difficult burden.90 An examination of animus under
the facts of Boudreaux necessarily began with the default rule that
Boudreaux, exercising quasi-corpus over the servitude,91 was presumed to
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. at 570 (Weimer, J., concurring).
Id. at 571.
Id.
Id. at 569–72.
Possession, supra note 6, at 554.
See discussion on “quasi-corpus” supra Part I.A.
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be in quasi-possession.92 The burden was then on Cummings to introduce
sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption.93 The plurality initially
recognized the importance of an effective rebuttal, underscoring the
importance of Cummings’s knowledge and acquiescence of Boudreaux’s
use as evidence that prescription never began to run.94 The concurrence
also recognized the importance of such evidence, pointing to “neighborly
acts” as proof that Boudreaux was never a true possessor.95 The dissenting
opinion by Justice Knoll, however, noted how the other opinions quickly
deviate from the presumption by “eviscerat[ing] the well-established
burden-shifting structure laid out in our Civil Code, allowing Cummings
to prevail based simply on an assertion of ‘neighborliness,’ despite his
failure to put on any evidence.”96 Though correctly stating the law, as the
dissent noted, the plurality and concurrence misapplied the true intention
of the law.
Boudreaux, as the quasi-possessor of the servitude, should have
benefited from the presumption that he was quasi-possessing as owner.
For Cummings to defeat this presumption, he needed to show through
evidence and therefore prove that Boudreaux’s quasi-possession was
precarious.97 The only proof that Cummings offered into evidence was that
Boudreaux and the Weills were good neighbors, which directly conflicted
with Boudreaux’s testimony: “I never got any permission . . . . We just
used [the right-of-way].”98 Boudreaux even offered further evidence
proving his true quasi-possession, including witness testimony about
continuous maintenance of the passage, contracts involving use of the
passage, and protection of the passage from possible public works
construction.99 Beyond mere assertions of being good neighbors,
Cummings did not offer any other evidence that could conclusively prove
that Boudreaux began his possession precariously.100

92. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427 (2017).
93. Id. art. 3432 cmt. b.
94. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564 (“[W]e find support for the conclusion that
Cummings’ awareness of Boudreaux’s use and his allowance thereof marks
Boudreaux’s use as an authorized use.” (emphasis added)).
95. Id. at 569 (Weimer, J., concurring) (“I find that the evidence of neighborly
acts . . . effectively rebuts any presumption.” (emphasis added)).
96. Id. at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting). As a note, for the remainder of this
Comment, when reference is made to the “dissenting opinion,” it is to the one
authored by Justice Knoll.
97. Id. at 566.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 567.
100. Id. at 568.
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By allowing this low bar for Cummings to defeat the established legal
presumption in favor of Boudreaux, the Court makes the acquisitive
prescription of a servitude as provided in the Civil Code nearly impossible.
For quasi-possession to be precarious, the Code requires either permission
from the owner or that quasi-possession was “on behalf of the owner.”101
Although civilian doctrine favorably endorses the idea of tacit permission,
and the Code seems to allow for that possibility,102 a distinction must be
drawn between actual ongoing tacit permission and convenient assertions
of tacit permission that occur after prescription has perhaps already run.
As the dissent recognized, the plurality’s analysis makes it nearly
impossible for someone to prescribe on an apparent servitude because
mere assertions of neighborly acts are sufficient to foreclose the running
of prescription.103 The dissent should have taken this observation, refined
it, and developed it further to its logical conclusion. Rather than making a
wholesale denial of the ability of tacit permission to defeat quasipossession, the dissent seems to underscore the fact that a party should do
more than merely state such a legal conclusion. By allowing a mere
assertion of good neighborliness after the fact, the plurality and
concurrence ignored the plain language that a quasi-possessor is presumed
to have animus “unless he began to possess . . . for another.”104 As opposed
to requiring actual evidence that tacit permission was present from the
beginning of the possessory period, the Court’s low standard that allows
assertions of tacit permission after the fact makes the acquisition of a predial
servitude by prescription constructively impossible.
After Boudreaux, a party may merely assert acts of good neighborliness
to defeat an opposing party’s claim for rights stemming from possession,
even if there is no evidence of permission or of quasi-possession begun for
another. The justices acted as lawmakers rather than as law interpreters by
changing the law or at least distorting legislative will.105 The Court allowed
mere assertions of tolerance to prove precariousness, and this possible
change in the law stems from the Court’s failure to engage in proper civilian
analysis.

101. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437 (2017).
102. Id.; PLANIOL, supra note 45, at 738–39.
103. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 568 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
104. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3427 (emphasis added). The person challenging the
quasi-possession must have “shown that the possession was begun for another”
before precarious possession is established. Id. art. 3427 cmt. d (emphasis added).
105. Id. art. 2 (“Legislation is a solemn expression of legislative will.”).
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2. One is Not Like the Other: Confusion of the Incorporeal Right
with the Corporeal Land
The recurring problem with all of the various opinions in Boudreaux
is the confusion of the incorporeal predial servitude, the right at issue in
the case, with the underlying corporeal land. Instead of recognizing two
distinct legal categories, the justices collapsed the incorporeal predial
servitude and the underlying corporeal land into one category.106 By
conflating these two distinct issues, the resulting analyses are difficult to
read and create legal uncertainty. This confusion stems from a failure to
proceed systematically in a civilian fashion—neither defining legal terms
nor proceeding with an adequately formed foundation.
One commentator foresaw the legal confusion that could result by
allowing acquisitive prescription on discontinuous predial servitudes:
“[S]ome of the changes may conflict with other articles of the Code or
result in unanticipated effects.”107 That conflict underlies the Court’s
analyses because the relevant Code articles apply to corporeal things,
distinctly different from the incorporeal things by which the articles are to
apply by analogy. The critical distinction that one must make when dealing
with an incorporeal right, such as a servitude, is the difference between the
incorporeal right and the corporeal land on which the servitude is
exercised. The person attempting to gain a servitude “possesses the real
right with the intent to have it as his own. However, he does not possess
the immovable that is burdened with his real right because he has no intent
to own that immovable.”108 The Court provides no explanation regarding
how to apply the Code articles, which themselves contemplate corporeal
things,109 to the incorporeal servitude at issue.110 The failure of the Court
to make this critical distinction is the key to understanding the subsequent
confusion.
Although the plurality began its analysis correctly when stating that it
was to determine whether to “recogniz[e] the plaintiff as the owner of a

106. See, e.g., Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562 (explaining that Boudreaux was
trying to prescribe on a predial servitude and that he would have had to have given
actual notice to the landowner).
107. Hannan, supra note 27, at 978.
108. Possession, supra note 6, at 541.
109. See supra Part I.B.
110. For example, the plurality points to “support in the law for implied or tacit
permission being the basis of precarious possession,” but provides no discussion
regarding how to apply that general characteristic of possession contemplating
corporeal things to an incorporeal servitude. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562.
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predial servitude over land owned by the defendant,”111 it erred when it
stated that, if Boudreaux were a precarious quasi-possessor, it would need
to determine whether Boudreaux ever changed his precarious status
through “actual notice to the landowner.”112 The plurality’s statement,
without any further explanation, is illogical because actual notice to the
landowner is not related to whether there is quasi-possession of a
servitude. Actual notice would instead have to be to the servitude owner.
Similarly, the concurring opinion collapsed the incorporeal servitude and
the corporeal land into one issue as well. The concurrence described the
lack of Boudreaux’s “intent[ion] to possess, as owner, the passageway”
and referenced the need to give actual “notice to Mr. Weill,” as owner.113
Putting those two assertions together, the concurrence equated Weill with
the owner of the servitude, when in fact Weill was merely the owner of the
underlying land instead. This confusion stems from the concurrence’s own
equivocal use of the word “passageway” to describe what Boudreaux was
trying to acquire through prescription.114 Finally, the principal dissenting
opinion failed to make a clear distinction between the incorporeal
servitude and the land, interchanging different elements of each.115
Because the issue in Boudreaux was prescription of an incorporeal
servitude of passage, the opinions’ loose use of terminology evidences a
failure to distinguish the servitude from the underlying land.
The plain language from the Civil Code clearly explains that
precarious quasi-possession “over a thing” occurs “with the permission of
or on behalf of the owner or possessor.”116 A precarious quasi-possessor
can terminate the precarious nature by “giv[ing] actual notice . . . to the
person on whose behalf he is possessing.”117 Reading in pari materia, a
111. Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 562.
113. Id. at 572 (Weimer, J., concurring).
114. The use of the term “passageway” implies an attempt to prescribe on the
physical land rather than on the servitude because a passageway is “[a] long,
narrow way, typically having walls on either side, that allows access between
buildings or to different rooms within a building.” Passageway, OXFORD LIVING
DICTIONARIES: ENGLISH, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/us/passage
way [https://perma.cc/7NQD-ASB2] (last visited Jan. 24, 2017).
115. An example of one such interchanging: “[W]hether [Boudreaux]
exercised this real right merely as a ‘precarious possessor’—that is, ‘with the
permission of or on behalf of’ Paul Christopher Cummings.” Boudreaux, 167 So.
3d at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting). The dissent thus also confused the incorporeal
servitude with the underlying corporeal land, making the landowner the same
person to own the incorporeal servitude. Id.
116. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437 (2017).
117. Id. art. 3439.
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person must give this notice to the owner or possessor of the thing over
which he or she is asserting quasi-possession. Because the thing in
Boudreaux was a predial servitude, if Boudreaux did indeed begin his
possession precariously, there would be no reason for him to change his
status vis-à-vis the landowner. Rather, he would instead have to provide
actual notice to the servitude owner, if there were one.118 The opinions
imply a logical impossibility by stating someone might be a precarious
possessor of an incorporeal servitude and then immediately asking
whether that person gave notice to the owner of corporeal land to end the
precariousness. This unfortunate confusion denies Boudreaux’s claim for
an incorporeal servitude simply because he could not prescribe on the
underlying corporeal land itself, contrary to the plain language of the Civil
Code.119
Had the Court consulted the limited jurisprudence, it would have
realized that permission to be on the land does not alone mean that a
servitude is precarious and that prescription is barred.120 In Levet v.
Lapeyrollerie, at issue was whether one of the parties had acquired,
through acquisitive prescription, an apparent, continuous predial servitude
of drain.121 Instead of including broad statements that permission
automatically excluded the running of prescription on a predial servitude,
the Court noted that the party claiming prescription had received “the
consent of [the landowner to dig] the canal.”122 The parties claiming
prescription in both Levet and Boudreaux had permission to be on the land,
the underlying corporeal thing, but neither case included any evidence of
whether there was permission to have a right over the land, such as a
predial servitude. The Levet Court, however, did not allow permission to
be on the land to defeat prescription on a servitude, providing that the party
118. A precarious possessor can end precariousness by actually notifying “the
person on whose behalf he is possessing.” Id. If Boudreaux was indeed possessing
the servitude precariously, he would have had to notify the servitude owner rather
than the landowner of his intention to begin possessing for himself. In Boudreaux,
as there was no servitude, there was no servitude owner for Boudreaux to notify.
119. See id. art. 740 (allowing for the creation of a servitude by acquisitive
prescription without requiring the ability to prescribe on the underlying land).
120. See Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, 1 So. 672, 673–74 (La. 1887) (holding that a
predial servitude of drain was created through acquisitive prescription despite the
fact that the dominant estate owner had the permission of the servient estate
owner); Guillote v. Wells, 485 So. 2d 187, 190–91 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that the plaintiff acquired a personal servitude of right of use by title over a gas
pipeline despite the fact there was an oral agreement of permission to use it).
121. Levet, 1 So. at 673.
122. Id.
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claiming prescription was “equally capable of acquiring [the servitude of
drain] by possession for the requisite length of time.”123 Had the Court in
Boudreaux consulted this limited, but important, jurisprudence, the
justices could have separated the two issues more easily, and the
permission claimed by Cummings would not have summarily defeated
Boudreaux’s claims.
By failing to consider the jurisprudence, the Court engaged in an
analysis tainted by an erroneous premise. Starting from the assertion that
Boudreaux began quasi-possession of the servitude with the permission of
his neighbor, the Court collapsed the servitude and the underlying land
into one issue, leading to an analysis incompatible with the Civil Code.
There is no question that Cummings, as the adjacent landowner, owned
the underlying corporeal land. The Court’s language, however, results in
confusion as to whether Boudreaux possessed the corporeal land on behalf
of Cummings or the incorporeal servitude on behalf of Cummings.
Without any explanatory analysis, the opinions produce logically
inconsistent statements that conflate the land with the servitude, a problem
that could have been avoided with proper civilian methodology.
III. BOUDREAUX V. CUMMINGS: AN ERRONEOUS
CIVILIAN METHODOLOGY
The failure to distinguish an incorporeal servitude from the underlying
corporeal land not only results in a confusing analysis but also forecloses
any possibility of reaching a logically consistent conclusion. A proper
civilian methodology dictates following all premises completely to their
logical conclusions by systematically using logic and deduction to proceed
“from the general to the particular.”124 Erring in the application of this
fundamental civilian approach, all of the Court’s opinions in Boudreaux
misstated their general premises and stopped too early in their respective
analyses. Consequently, taking the Court’s premises and following them
to their logical conclusions reveals inconsistencies between the opinions
and the Civil Code as a whole.
A. In the Beginning is the Code
As the fountainhead of private law in Louisiana,125 the Civil Code is
the foundation on which courts must build their legal analyses. Judges
must place their legal reasoning into the framework of the Code’s general
123. Id. at 674.
124. Bergel, supra note 15, at 1083.
125. Osakwe, supra note 12, at 41.
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articles because they are “required to return again and again to the Code
seeking its guiding values and adhering as closely to them as possible.”126
If the Supreme Court justices had viewed the Civil Code as a unified whole
and formulated their analyses from that general foundation, they would
have avoided the ensuing inconsistency. There are two errors that are
particularly prominent once the Court’s analyses are compared with the
relevant codal provisions.
First, by not consulting the portion of the Civil Code explaining
predial servitudes, the Court’s opinions all failed to identify the
fundamental characteristic of predial servitudes: they require two different
estates with two different owners.127 If such a characteristic does not
obtain, then the civilian concept of confusion results, leading to either the
extinction of a pre-existing servitude or the inability for one to form in the
first instance.128 If, as the Court’s various opinions suggest, Boudreaux
possessed the servitude precariously on behalf of Cummings, then the next
logical step must be that Cummings was both the dominant estate owner
and the servient estate owner. This conclusion, however, is incompatible
with the requirement that a servitude must have different estate owners,129
and the lack of any explanation by the Court results in an absurd
conclusion.
Second, the various opinions are incomplete in their analyses, leading
to confusion over the meaning of precarious possession and precarious
quasi-possession. By ignoring the only immediately relevant Civil Code
article130 and directly applying the articles on possession to quasipossession, the Court’s resulting conclusions conflict with the basic
foundation of the law. The Court failed to acknowledge that, when
analyzing the quasi-possession of an incorporeal real right rather than the
possession of a corporeal thing, “things are not nearly so black and white.
In fact, quasi-possession, far from being incompatible with . . . a grant of
permission, presupposes it!”131 Although a fundamental characteristic of a
servitude is permission to use the underlying corporeal immovable, none
of the opinions made this fundamental distinction. The Court’s failure to
acknowledge the characteristic elements of quasi-possession by analogy
caused the justices to miss a fundamental reality: a quasi-possessor is at
126. Dennis, supra note 60, at 17.
127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (2017).
128. Id. art. 765 (explaining the working of “confusion” to terminate a predial
servitude when one and the same person comes to own the entirety of both the
dominant estate and the servient estate burdened by the servitude).
129. Id. art. 646.
130. Id. art. 3421.
131. TRAHAN, supra note 31, at 176.
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one and the same time both a true, or not precarious, quasi-possessor of
the servitude real right and a precarious possessor of the underlying
corporeal immovable.132 The absolute insistence on permission defeating
the acquisition of a predial servitude is incomprehensible when fit into the
proper framework of true quasi-possession of a servitude. Though a
servitude implies permission to be on the underlying land, there is not, by
that fact alone, permission to hold the accompanying incorporeal real
right.
To remedy this confusion, the Court should have contemplated the
meaning of precarious quasi-possession of an incorporeal servitude. One
illustration of such quasi-possession is as follows. X receives a predial
servitude of passage by acquiring a title thereto from the landowner, Y. X,
in turn, grants a lease on that incorporeal servitude of passage to Z. In that
instance, as a lessee, Z is a precarious quasi-possessor of the servitude
because he is quasi-possessing it with the permission of the servitude
owner, X. The only way for Z to end his precarious possession would be
to give actual notice to the owner of the servitude—the “thing” in
question—that he was beginning true quasi-possession.133 By failing to
contemplate this key legal distinction between an incorporeal servitude as
separate from the underlying land, the justices reached the conclusion that
“Boudreaux was possessing the right of passage precariously.”134 If the
Court had not intended to reach this conclusion that flows from its
premises, the justices should not have neglected to apply the articles on
quasi-possession as they were intended—by analogy.
B. Legal History Repeats Itself
The plurality and concurring opinions’ inconsistent results and logical
failures when applying the Civil Code may be surprising, but Boudreaux
is not the first case involving predial servitudes in which the Louisiana
Supreme Court has engaged in erroneous civilian analysis. The Court
heard a remarkably similar case 40 years before Boudreaux. In Louisiana
Irrigation & Mill Company v. Pousson, at issue was whether there was an
aqueduct servitude established over the immovable property of several
landowners, including the defendant.135 By making statements like “[t]he
132. Id. at 176 n.6 (“[T]he servitude holder, through one and the same acts,
simultaneously quasi-possesses the servitude for himself and precariously possesses
the underlying corporeal immovable for his grantor, [which is] ‘compound’
possession.”).
133. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3439.
134. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. 2015).
135. Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co. v. Pousson, 265 So. 2d 756, 757 (La. 1972).
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described servitude was a canal” and “[t]here is no allegation that plaintiff
possessed the canal,”136 the majority’s first error was collapsing the
incorporeal predial servitude and the underlying corporeal canal into one
thing. The Pousson Court failed to clarify whether the issue for it to decide
was the acquisition of an incorporeal servitude of aqueduct or of a
corporeal canal.
The Pousson majority also erroneously equated the actions that would
be sufficient for eviction of a regular possessor to what would be sufficient
to evict a quasi-possessor. This equation stemmed from the Court’s failure
to proceed by analogy. Because a servitude is an incorporeal thing and
does not physically exist in space, multiple people can use the same
underlying corporeal thing—a canal in Pousson—at the same time.137
Theoretically, there are no actions that should result in an automatic
eviction from an incorporeal servitude, yet the majority still noted: “The
1967 and 1968 usurpation of the lateral canal by defendant clearly resulted
in a loss of possession by plaintiff.”138 If the defendant and plaintiff used
the canal at the same time, there would have been no usurpation if both
had been able to use it fully. By failing to notice the basic legal principles
regarding possession and quasi-possession of the Civil Code, the resulting
analysis by the majority does not fit logically into the larger statutory
scheme.
Unlike Boudreaux, however, not all of the Pousson opinions failed to
use proper civilian methodology. The dissenting opinion proceeded
systematically with the general principles of the Civil Code and carefully
incorporated proper language and categorization of the things in
question.139 The opinion neatly kept the issues clear and avoided a
conflation of the incorporeal servitude with the corporeal canal.140 The
dissent carefully noted that use of the portion of a canal was a “species of
quasi-possession of th[e] incorporeal right” and that such a use comported
with “that species of possession of which the right was susceptible.”141
Unlike the loose and interchangeable language used by the majority to
136. Id. (emphasis added).
137. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 649 (classifying a predial servitude as an incorporeal
immovable, meaning it does not exist in space); id. art. 748 (charging that a servient
estate owner can do nothing to make the servitude use more inconvenient). Putting
these two provisions together, as long as multiple predial servitudes do not diminish
the other holders’ enjoyment, it is theoretically possible for there to be multiple
servitudes over one servient estate.
138. Pousson, 265 So. 2d at 758.
139. Id. at 76162 (Barham, J., dissenting).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 763.
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describe the issue, the dissenter carefully chose clear language: “[P]laintiff
continually possessed the right to operate the irrigation canal for many
years.”142 By emphasizing the right over the canal, the dissenting opinion
maintained the critical distinction. Unfortunately, the majority in Pousson
and the plurality, concurrence, and dissent in Boudreaux failed to replicate
this careful, civilian approach.
C. The Root of the Problem: Forgetting the Roots
The pervasive problems in the Boudreaux opinions stem from a
misapplication of Louisiana’s civilian principles in three distinct ways.
First, the justices’ analyses illustrate an incorporation of common law
elements. Second, the justices misapplied doctrinal analysis to support
their positions. Finally, and most importantly, the justices evinced a clearly
misguided application of proper civilian methodology.
1. Louisiana: Where the Common Law Should Not be So Common
The first error by the justices was their use of common law methods
of analyses as opposed to proper civilian methods. Louisiana is a unique
state that has a legal system based on both the common and civil law, and
that mixture results in judges who “giv[e] elaborate statements of facts and
discussion of precedents—even when interpreting and applying the Civil
Code.”143 Applying common law methods of interpretation to strictly
civilian areas of the law is a temptation in Louisiana jurisprudence, leading
to a mixture of incompatible legal concepts. The common law includes a
focus on the specific facts with a narrowly tailored holding, antithetical to
the civilian approach that focuses on applying generalized rules.144 By not
striking a proper balance between the general law and specific facts, the
Court can easily forget about the guiding principles of the law, as is
apparent in the Boudreaux analyses. The plurality actually took that
explicit position: “Our holding today is strictly limited to the facts before
us.”145
The common law also includes a primary focus on prior jurisprudence
when arriving at a result, rather than focusing on the written law and
doctrine. Civil law methodology, on the other hand, focuses on “legal
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. Dennis, supra note 60, at 1.
144. Tetley, supra note 63, at 702 (“Common law jurisprudence sets out a new
specific rule to a new specific set of facts . . . while civil law jurisprudence applies
general principles.”).
145. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 564 (La. 2015).
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principles” and their meaning and function “in terms of rights and
obligations.”146 The starting point for the civil law is thus the general legal
principles as opposed to the holdings of previous cases. With such a
strained analysis, the Court easily erred in the application of the various
interpretive tools at its disposal. The plurality’s ultimate conclusion
follows after stating, “[t]his court has declared that ‘servitudes are
restraints on the free disposal and use of property, and are not . . . entitled
to be viewed with favor by the law.’”147 Although the maxim stated by the
plurality that doubts about servitudes are to be resolved without restraining
the landowner is actually rooted in the civilian doctrine,148 the plurality
chose to cite prior cases rather than either the law or the doctrine that has
analyzed the maxim.149 As compared with pages of confusing analysis, the
one statement that the plurality roots in jurisprudence appears to lead
directly to the eventual holding.
This inordinate focus on jurisprudence led the Court to neglect one
vital Civil Code article on the interpretation of servitudes. When there are
ambiguities involved in determining the type of right at issue, the Code
provides: “When the right granted be of a nature to confer an advantage
on an estate, it is presumed to be a predial servitude.”150 The threshold
issue in whether to apply this interpretive article is whether there is
actually a right at issue. Because of the alleged permission given by the
Weills for Boudreaux to be on the land, the Court automatically foreclosed
on the possibility that Boudreaux could have acquired any kind of right.151
Such a conclusion does not follow,152 but it instead prevented the Court
from engaging in a complete analysis.
In Levet, as in Boudreaux, there were no written documents or
definitive testimony to establish what kind of right, if any, the supposed
prescriber had established. Not allowing permission to be on the land to
defeat a full analysis, however, the Levet Court applied the predecessor to
this article, concluding that a predial servitude had been created by
acquisitive prescription.153 Applying that analysis in Boudreaux, the
characteristics of a predial servitude of passage become apparent. The
dominant estate, owned by Boudreaux, was farmland that required
146. Tetley, supra note 63, at 702.
147. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564–65.
148. LA. CIV. CODE art. 730 cmt. b (2017).
149. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564–65 (citing to three prior cases rather than
the Civil Code or to civilian doctrine).
150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 733.
151. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 564.
152. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
153. Levet v. Lapeyrollerie, 1 So. 672, 674 (La. 1887).
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convenient access to the public roadway to use the land as intended.154
This use comports with both the meaning of a predial servitude and of a
servitude of passage.155 Even if servitudes are not to be favored in the law,
such a rule should only apply if, even after examining the supposed right
in question, ambiguities remain. In Boudreaux, Boudreaux claimed a right
that was clearly “of a nature to confer an advantage on an estate,”156
establishing a rebuttable presumption in favor of Boudreaux. Even if
jurisprudence says otherwise, the Code, being read as a unified whole,
should always be at the forefront of legal analysis.
2. No Doctrine in the House: Misuse of a Critical Civilian
Component
The second failure by the justices is their misuse of doctrinal analysis
to support the reasoning of their opinions. The plurality cited the Louisiana
Civil Law Treatise on Predial Servitudes when discussing acquisitive
prescription of a servitude.157 The portion of the Treatise cited by the
Court, in turn, discusses the French historical background of acquisitive
prescription of servitudes, yet there is no further discussion within the
opinion concerning how France or other civilian jurisdictions have since
handled the issue.158 Furthermore, since the first Louisiana Civil Code, a
subsequent revision has recognized discontinuous apparent servitudes,159
which is an issue still not recognized under French law.160 Though there is
some disconnection between the French background and current Louisiana
law, there is no discussion within the opinion involving other civilian
jurisdictions that have similar provisions to the current Louisiana law.161
The major problem with the use of French doctrine, or Louisiana doctrine
based on historical French sources, is that those commentaries stem from

154. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 560.
155. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 646 (explaining that the dominant estate enjoys a
benefit); id. art. 705 (explaining that a servitude of passage allows, inter alia,
persons and vehicles to pass on land).
156. Id. art. 733.
157. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 562–63.
158. Id. at 563.
159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 740 cmt. a.
160. A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PREDIAL SERVITUDES § 6:31, in 4 LOUISIANA
CIVIL LAW TREATISE 435 (4th ed. 2014).
161. Greece allows for acquisitive prescription on all servitudes, and Italy, like
Louisiana, allows prescription on apparent servitudes. A. N. Yiannopoulos,
Creation of Servitudes by Prescription and Destination of the Owner, 43 LA. L.
REV. 57, 58 (1982) [hereinafter Creation of Servitudes].
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the legal principle that one could only acquire continuous predial
servitudes through prescription.162
Writing at a time when the French legislature as a policy matter chose
to disallow acquisition of any discontinuous predial servitude,163 there was
no need for commentators to delineate what types of acts could lead to
prescription or what would lead to precarious quasi-possession. The
legislative equation of simple acts of tolerance and good neighborliness
with discontinuous predial servitudes led to analyses that acquisitive
prescription on discontinuous servitudes could not occur: “[The
landowner] is therefore deemed to tolerate such acts through a spirit of
good vicinage . . . . These servitudes, when not based upon a title, are
tainted with precariousness. . . . And these circumstances make
prescription impossible.”164 Because current Louisiana law on acquisitive
prescription of servitudes differs from the historical French law, the
justices should have recognized this difference and incorporated it into
their analyses.
3. The Final Straw: A Strong Civilian Foundation but a Weak
Building
The third, final, and most unfortunate error of the justices in
Boudreaux is their misapplication of methodology and their incomplete
analyses of the relevant Civil Code articles. Because of the importance of
proper classification in property law, particularly with such a difficult
topic as predial servitudes,165 proper civilian methodology is critical “to
consider codal provisions that have been hidden between the lines for the
last thirty years.”166 The acquisition of a discontinuous predial servitude
of passage is a relatively new issue in property law,167 so the charge on the
162. When drafting the French Civil Code, a compromise between competing
factions was reached in which “acquisitive prescription was accepted only as to
continuous and apparent servitudes.” Id. at 59.
163. FRANÇOIS LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 310–11
(1878), translated by John Randall Trahan (2015) (on file with author).
164. PLANIOL, supra note 45, at 738–39.
165. Boris Kozolchyk, On Predial Servitudes, Civil Law Institutions and
Common Law Attitudes—Apropos of Yiannopoulos’ Predial Servitudes, 59 TUL.
L. REV. 517, 517 (1984) (discussing the difficulty of conceptualizing the subject
of predial servitudes).
166. Hannan, supra note 27, at 938.
167. Because of its enactment effective January 1, 1978, the first date for 30
year acquisitive prescription of a discontinuous predial servitude was January 1,
2008. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 740 cmt. a. Boudreaux represents the first case
dealing with the issue.
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courts is to “carefully consider the effects of these unprecedented
servitudes under the Revision.”168 Particularly in an area with such little
guidance, civilian judges must sometimes reason a pari, or by analogy, an
important method in civilian methodology,169 to resolve the conflict in
accord with the Civil Code.170 In this case, the Code itself provides that
judges are to proceed according to analogy.171 With a cursory glance at the
opinions in Boudreaux, it may appear that the justices adhered to these
civilian principles with their citation of many Civil Code articles.
However, the problem is that there is a civilian façade, but a lack of any
detailed analysis or application.172 For example, the plurality wrote for the
reader to “see” a Civil Code article that does not discuss quasi-possession
at all, and the Court failed to explain how one should analogize from that
article to the issue being considered.173
The Court proceeded with its incomplete use of the Civil Code by
misstating a critical aspect of the law of quasi-possession of an incorporeal
immovable: “Louisiana Civil Code article 742, . . . provides ‘the laws
governing acquisitive prescription of immovable property apply to
apparent servitudes.’”174 Although the cited article is ostensibly applicable
to Boudreaux, the plurality relegated to a passing footnote the later
fundamental article that states how the laws are to apply to acquisitive
prescription of predial servitudes: by analogy.175 The fact that the issue
before the Court involved little legislative guidance, almost nonexistent
jurisprudence, and scarce commentary does not excuse a failure to explain
168. Hannan, supra note 27, at 940.
169. Dennis, supra note 60, at 11–12 (discussing the use of reasoning by
analogy).
170. Id.
171. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421.
172. See, e.g., Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 563 (La. 2015) (citing
to various Civil Code articles involving possession properly so-called, including
articles 3424, 3435, and 3476, regarding corporeal possession and the qualities of
effective possession, without any discussion on how to apply them by analogy to
the quasi-possession of an incorporeal predial servitude).
173. When explaining that Boudreaux would need to give actual notice to the
landowner to end his precarious possession, the plurality cites to the Louisiana
Civil Code, but the cited article, 3478, does not say how it would apply to a
servitude owner. The plurality fails to explain how to apply it by analogy. Id. at
562; see LA. CIV. CODE art. 3478 (explaining how a precarious possessor, rather
than a precarious quasi-possessor, would terminate precarious possession and
begin to acquisitively prescribe).
174. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 563.
175. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3421. For the passing footnote, see Boudreaux, 167
So. 3d at 560 n.2.
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and incorporate more fully the most relevant Code article on the issue.
Beyond oblique references, none of the justices included any discussion
on how to proceed by analogy, and they failed to indicate any legal
differences when a person is prescribing on an incorporeal servitude rather
than on a corporeal thing like land.176
Although the plurality and concurring opinions relied heavily on the
concept of “acts of simple tolerance,” all of the opinions failed to articulate
a clear definition of the concept. In keeping with its misapplication of
civilian doctrine, the Court, though citing to it briefly,177 failed to fully use
one of the tools available to Louisiana civilians, the Dictionary of the Civil
Code, which itself provides a useful definition of acts of simple tolerance:
“[E]ntering onto the land of another which, because it is done with the
express or tacit consent of the owner, does not amount to an act of
possession capable of establishing acquisitive prescription.”178 If the
justices had cited to this definition, and accordingly adapted it by analogy
to acquisitive prescription of incorporeal servitudes, then the resulting
analyses would have fit better within the Civil Code’s framework by
providing a foundational premise.
Although using some foreign doctrine, the justices failed to include
any relevant commentary from Marcel Planiol, who also provided a clear
foundation for acts of tolerance and precariousness: “[Precariousness of a
servitude] consists in accomplishing, on somebody else’s property,
through mere tolerance, acts which would be the exercise of a servitude if
performed in virtue of a right.”179 The justices would have had to place
this definition into context, however, because, unlike the consistent use
made by Boudreaux of the passageway,180 the acts described by Planiol
are those “performed at long intervals . . . compatible with the ordinary
enjoyment of the thing by its owner.”181 Planiol equated “acts of mere
tolerance” with “be[ing] on good terms with . . . neighbors,”182 appearing
to describe acts of tolerance as involving a much lower level of activity
176. E.g., Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 560–61; id. at 568–69 (Weimer, J.,
concurring); id. at 565 (Knoll, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 572 n.9 (Weimer, J., concurring).
178. CORNU, supra note 36, at 556.
179. PLANIOL, supra note 45, at 742. The writings of Marcel Planiol, a
renowned French civil law professor, are so insightful because of his highly
influential treatise on the French Civil Code, since translated by the Louisiana
State Law Institute as an important interpretive tool of the meaning of the
Louisiana Civil Code. Algero, supra note 2, at 794 n.87.
180. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 560.
181. PLANIOL, supra note 45, at 742.
182. Id. at 743.
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than that of Boudreaux. Planiol’s conclusion is that someone who
performs these acts on another’s property implicitly recognizes permission
from the landowner and cannot prescribe.183 The concurrence cited this
conclusion without any of the surrounding context,184 so there is no
understanding of how Planiol’s analysis was formed by the older,
traditional French model.
Because of the change in legislative policy between the traditional
French approach and the modern Louisiana approach, the justices should
have placed the doctrine into its proper context and then reasoned by
analogy. With a discontinuous predial servitude like a servitude of passage,
acts that constitute corpus are similar to those acts that would only constitute
acts of simple tolerance.185 Because Louisiana law now allows prescription
on these types of servitudes, the analysis cannot simply end with equating
acts of a discontinuous apparent predial servitude with acts of tolerance.
Instead, the analysis becomes fact-intensive, with the fact finder having
“complete discretion to determine whether the acts that are claimed to be
acts of possession . . . have or have not been exercised . . . [as] simple
tolerance.”186 The fact finder must distinguish between acts of simple
tolerance that include “benevolence”187 or “express or tacit permission of
the owner”188 from those acts that would be intense and continuous enough
that they would “constitute an impingement on the rights of another.”189
Boudreaux’s aggressive and intense use of the pathway for over 50
years to move heavy farm equipment, among other uses,190 appears to go
beyond the acts of simple tolerance envisioned by the French
commentators. At the very least, the decision of such a fact-intensive issue
that seems to go beyond simple tolerance should have been within the
pervasive authority of the fact finder, whose conclusions should be entitled
to deference.191 Faced with a new legal issue and armed with little actual
guidance, the Court should have remained faithful to the Civil Code and
proper civilian analysis, but its failure resulted in confusion of the issue at
hand, unclear definitions, and uncertainty in the ensuing law.
183. Id.
184. Boudreaux, 167 So. 3d at 570–71 (Weimer, J., concurring).
185. LAURENT, supra note 163, at 310–11.
186. MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANÇAIS: LES BIENS 940–41 (Maurice Picard rev. 2d ed. 1952), translated
by John Randall Trahan (2015) (on file with author).
187. LAURENT, supra note 163, at 311.
188. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 186, at 940.
189. Id. at 942.
190. Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 560 (La. 2015).
191. LAURENT, supra note 163, at 312–13.
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IV. SOLUTION: IT’S IN THE CODE . . . OR SHOULD BE
Although it is too late to fix the erroneous analysis in Boudreaux,
Louisiana judges can still ensure that a misapplication of the civilian
approach to the private law does not happen again. It is beyond the scope
of this Comment to provide a comprehensive solution to the
misapplication of civilian methodology, but there are three ways in which
courts can return to their civilian roots. First, Louisiana judges must return
to the Civil Code and its basic legal principles. Even when the Civil Code
may not be as clear or complete as might be ideal, it remains the proper
foundation to build a subsequent analysis. Second, judges must refrain
from the tendency to elevate detailed facts over the law and instead keep
clarity and proper categorization in the forefront of their analyses. Finally,
when dealing specifically with the issue presented in Boudreaux, where
courts are unable to apply the law properly, whether directly or by analogy,
the legislature, rather than the judiciary, must provide a remedy.
A. The Civil Code: Louisiana’s Ace in the Hole
Any type of solution must first recognize the primacy of the Louisiana
Civil Code as containing one of the primary sources of law—legislation.192
Solutions to new legal problems, whether acquisitive prescription or
something else, must fit within the general framework of the Code, which
is a “bod[y] of coherent and organized rules and not a mere ‘mosaic
without unity.’”193 Acquisitive prescription of discontinuous predial
servitudes might be a new problem, but new problems pose no
impossibilities in the civilian tradition because “Civil Code articles tend
to be written in general terms . . . to last through time and be applied to
changing circumstances.”194 By not drawing on the Code’s general
precepts, courts ignore a fundamental foundation that provides, at the very
least, a starting point for further analysis. Although the justices may have
been confused as to how to handle a new problem, “when viewed through
the proper lens, the framework for adjudicating these new rights [was]
already in place.”195 The tools for the justices to use were available right
in front of them: the articles of the Civil Code and the civilian
methodology of reasoning by analogy. Fortunately, those same tools
remain readily available for all future judges when facing similarly new
and complex legal issues.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Algero, supra note 2, at 793.
Bergel, supra note 15, at 1084.
Algero, supra note 2, at 793.
Hannan, supra note 27, at 987.
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Civilian judges have a sworn duty to give “the public consistent,
faithful[,] and equal application of the legislated laws.”196 This duty to
uphold the legislated laws entails much more than recitation of the Civil
Code, but rather requires a rigorous application of its articles. Accordingly,
when deciding a case in an ambiguous area of the law, the judge should
stay “as closely as possible to the values of the Code” when arriving at the
proper solution.197 If judges still cannot make sense of the law,198 and
cannot proceed by analogy, the Code provides the basis for a solution:
“[P]roceed according to equity. To decide equitably, resort is made to
justice, reason, and prevailing usages.”199 Judges, however, must clearly
state that they are proceeding in such a way, and, even in equity, they
“should keep the Civil Code . . . at the forefront,” making careful use of
analogous legislation.200 Judges cannot simply proceed in their analyses as
though the Civil Code articles are simply another piece of ordinary
legislation because the Code represents a unified whole.201 When the judge
recognizes that all of the different parts of the Code interact and form a
coherent whole, then there is less potential for narrow results that might
comport with one part of the Code but contradict another part.
B. A Clear Analysis Begins with a Clear Premise
Clarity of terms and proper categorization are two essential features in
a proper civilian presentation of the law.202 Because the civil law is
organized as an internally consistent system, judges must define the issue
at hand precisely and proceed with consistent logic. Proper categorization
and clear terminology are especially imperative when proceeding by
analogy: “Classifications by categories and successive sub-categories
make it possible to apply . . . the rules regulating a wide range of situations
analogous to all the particular situations which fall under those rules.”203
When proceeding with proper codal categorization of issues, not only do
196. Dennis, supra note 60, at 2.
197. Id. at 3.
198. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017) (explaining law is both legislation and custom).
199. Id. art. 4.
200. Algero, supra note 2, at 797.
201. Bergel, supra note 15, at 1079 (“[C]odification is to be contrasted with
simple legislation tailored to the circumstances.” (emphasis added)).
202. Tetley, supra note 63, at 709 (“The civil law traditional method . . .
consists in characterizing the dispute as belonging a [sic] defined category, and
then identifying the applicable internal law . . . of the category concerned.”).
203. Bergel, supra note 15, at 1083 (discussing the importance of a codified
system and its unique way of proceeding in interpretation).
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judges produce analyses that are easier for practitioners and even
laypeople to read, but they also reduce their chances of applying civilian
principles incorrectly. Had the justices in Boudreaux followed this step,
they would have averted both the conflation of two distinct legal issues
and the incorporation of analyses inconsistent with the codal framework.
C. The Legislative Solution: A Balancing Act
If a good-faith use of civilian methodology cannot solve a legal
problem or if a judicial solution is untenable, the question becomes
whether the legislature, as the proper lawmaker, should intervene.
Regarding the issues in Boudreaux, the legislature could possibly clarify
and expand the solitary directive to analogize the articles involving
possession to quasi-possession. At the same time, implicit in the ability to
craft new legislation is also the responsibility of the legislature to respect
its own duty “to set, by taking a broad approach, the general propositions
of the law . . . and not to get down [sic] the details of questions which may
arise in particular instances.”204 Respecting this responsibility, the
legislature could still enact a new codal section specifically applicable to
the quasi-possession of incorporeal real rights, lessening the need to
analogize in an area of the law that is difficult to conceptualize on a caseby-case basis.
Because of all of the references in both the Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise on Predial Servitudes205 and the Boudreaux opinions206 to “acts of
simple tolerance” or other synonymous terms, one place for the legislature
to start would be to provide a legal definition for the concept, especially
in relation to the quasi-possession of servitudes. Although a civil code
generally eschews the inclusion of detailed definitions,207 such a use is
warranted in this case because of the uniquely difficult conceptual nature
of the issue. The Court seemed to struggle with the concept that permission
to use the underlying land does not ipso facto make the possession of an
incorporeal servitude precarious, so clarification of acts of tolerance and
how they relate to both corporeal and incorporeal things would be useful.
Because of the fact-intensive nature of determining whether acts go
beyond simple tolerance,208 a definition would at least provide a
foundation for the fact finder to begin an analysis, especially in the case of
lay jurors who already lack a background in civilian legal reasoning.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 1082.
YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 160, § 6:36, at 451–52.
E.g., Boudreaux v. Cummings, 167 So. 3d 559, 562–63 (La. 2015).
Tetley, supra note 63, at 703–04.
LAURENT, supra note 163, at 312–13.

1174

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77

On the one hand, people should expect that “certain invasions in the
spirit of good neighborhood” are customary among neighboring
landowners and would not ordinarily lead to the prescription of a
servitude.209 On the other hand, however, if all invasions are excluded,
then there would be an effective abrogation of the law allowing such
acquisitive prescription. The question then appears to become one of the
intensity or duration of such an invasion. The types of actions which could
lead to the creation of a servitude also include a distinct public policy
element: when should neighboring landowners be in danger of losing a
part of their ownership rights through the creation of a servitude? Related
to that issue, in the interest of amicable resolution and judicial economy,
there is also a question of when should a landowner be compelled to evict
a neighbor or bring him or her to court. Instead of allowing judges to
decide such substantive civilian legal principles on an ad hoc basis, it is
instead within the proper realm of the legislature as lawmaker to decide
those issues, ensuring a consistent framework and foundation from which
courts can then provide more specific applications.
D. Right Result?
Whether the result would have been different in Boudreaux is not the
critical issue addressed by this Comment. Although concededly the result
makes a difference for the application of the law in Louisiana—and this
Comment indicates where the law potentially stands—the most important
consideration is how the result was reached. With confusing language,
improper definitions and categorization, and a misapplication of the Civil
Code, why there might have been a change in the law and how that change
should be interpreted are both left unanswered. A proper methodology
may have arrived at the same result, although it is more likely that the
opposite result, especially if given to the fact finder,210 would have
obtained. Regardless of what the right result should have been, a proper
civilian methodology is fundamental to arriving at a conclusion that is both
articulable and logical.
CONCLUSION
Confronting a yet unresolved legal issue, the Louisiana Supreme
Court should have fully relied on its civilian heritage to resolve Boudreaux
v. Cummings. Although providing a foundation that promised a distinctly
civilian approach, the Court erred in its application to the underlying
209. Creation of Servitudes, supra note 161, at 71.
210. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.
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complex facts of Boudreaux. Rather than actually interpreting the Civil
Code as the source of private substantive law within the state, the Court
failed to provide a proper analysis of an issue minimally addressed by the
relevant Code articles. By neglecting to follow its premises to their logical
conclusions, the Court not only collapsed two distinct legal issues into one
issue but also created an unsettled analysis regarding the state of legal
presumptions within the law of possession. Although an admittedly mixed
jurisdiction, Louisiana still professes to be civilian in the realm of
substantive private law, and the courts should back this assertion, not with
a mere recitation of the Civil Code, but with an actual, good-faith use of
it.
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